I just finished Bertrand Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy. It took me about three months to work my way through its 800+ pages. In my (and its) defense, I was doing fine up to Aristotle, when I lost all momentum and started reading Patrick O’Brian instead. I think that’s more Aristotle’s fault than Russell’s.
The book is written for a general audience—apparently, Russell wrote it for the money. Unlike a lot of survey introductions to philosophy, it’s written by a (presumably) card-carrying philosopher rather than a teacher. This allows Russell the freedom to entertain, to be witty and even snarky, to indulge in some professional squabbling. Russell ties philosophy closely to history, which gives the book some structure and the naive reader some signposts.
Apparently, a host of academics complained about omissions, oversimplifications, and dismissals of various philosophers. I’m not competent to judge this, but I think it’s noteworthy that reviewers more familiar with classical philosophy tended to think the modern sections were OK, while reviewers with more of a modern background thought the book was fine until it got to their specialty.
In any case, I enjoyed this once I got over the speed bumps. I might have done better with a primer in the other hand to remind myself of little things like what “idealism” has meant throughout the years. Every now and then there’s a paragraph that repays a few readings. Here’s a few of those, starting with a discussion of the effects of science on philosophical outlooks.
Meanwhile science as technique was building up in practical men a quite different outlook from any that was to be found among theoretical philosophers. Technique conferred a sense of power: man is now much less at the mercy of his environment than he was in former times. But the power conferred by technique is social, not individual; an average individual wrecked on a desert island could have achieved more in the seventeenth century than he could now. Scientific technique requires the co-operation of a large number of individuals organized under a single direction. Its tendency, therefore, is against anarchism and even individualism, since it demands a well-knit social structure. Unlike religion, it is ethically neutral: it assures men that they can perform wonders, but it does not tell them what wonders to perform. In this way it is incomplete. In practice, the purposes to which scientific skill will be devoted depend largely on chance. The men at the head of the vast organizations which it necessitates can, within limits, turn it this way or that as they please. The power impulse thus has a scope which it never had before. The philosophies that have been inspired by scientific technique are power philosophies, and tend to regard everything non-human as mere raw material. Ends are no longer considered; only the skillfulness of the process is valued. This is also a form of madness. It is, in our day, the most dangerous form, and the one against which a sane philosophy should provide an antidote.
(Italics are in the original, and the bold emphasis is mine.)
On society and genius:
The political conditions of the Renaissance favored individual development, but were unstable; the instability and the individualism were closely connected, as in ancient Greece. A stable social system is necessary, but every stable system hitherto devised has hampered the development of exceptional artistic or intellectual merit. How much murder and anarchy are we prepared to endure for the sake of great achievements such as those of the Renaissance? In the past, a great deal; in our own time, much less. No solution of this problem has hitherto been found, although increase of social organization is making it continually more important.
On Rousseau, and heaven:
However ardently I, or all mankind, may desire something, however necessary it may be for human happiness, that is no ground for supposing this something to exist. There is no law of nature guaranteeing that mankind should be happy. Everybody can see that this is true of our life here on earth, but by a curious twist our very sufferings in this life are made into an argument for a better life hereafter. We should not employ such an argument in any other connection. If you had bought ten dozen eggs from a man, and the first dozen were all rotten, you would not infer that the remaining nine dozen must be of surpassing excellence; yet that is the kind of reasoning that “the heart” encourages as a consolation for our sufferings here below.
And, finally, a sentence originally written about one bit of history but applicable to many others.
In a hopeful age, great present evils can be endured, because it is thought that they will pass; but in a tired age even real goods lose their savour.
